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ABSTRACT
Phishing websites are still a major threat in today’s Internet ecosys-
tem. Despite numerous previous efforts, black and whitelisting
methods do not offer sufficient protection – in particular against
zero-day phishing attacks. This paper contributes WhiteNet, a new
similarity-based phishing detection framework, based on a triplet
network with three shared Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs).
WhiteNet learns profiles for websites in order to detect zero-day
phishing websites by a “visual whitelist”. We furthermore present
WhitePhish, the largest dataset to date that facilitates visual phish-
ing detection in an ecologically valid manner. We show that our
method detects zero-day pages and outperforms previous visual
similarity phishing detection approaches by a large margin while
being robust against a range of evasion attacks.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy → Web application security; • Com-
puting methodologies→Machine learning approaches;
KEYWORDS
Phishing Detection; Visual Similarity; Whitelisting; Triplet Net-
works
1 INTRODUCTION
Phishing pages impersonate legitimate websites without permis-
sion [49] to steal sensitive data from users causing major financial
losses and privacy violations [10, 19, 20, 47]. Phishing attacks have
increased due to the advances in creating phishing kits that en-
abled the deployment of phishing pages on larger scales [10, 37].
According to the Anti-Phishing Working Group (APWG) [2], an in-
ternational association aiming at fighting phishing attacks, 266,387
attempts have been reported in the third quarter of 2019, which is
a high level that has not been witnessed since 2016 [2].
There have been numerous attempts to combat the threats im-
posed by phishing attacks by automatically detecting phishing
pages. Modern browsers mostly rely on blacklisting [44] as a fun-
damentally reactive mechanism. However, in a recent empirical
study [36], the new phishing pages that used cloaking techniques
were found to be both harder and slower to get detected by black-
lists which motivates the development of proactive solutions. An
example of the latter is using heuristics that are based on monitored
phishing pages [20]. These heuristics can be extracted from URL
strings [4, 35, 55] or HTML [9, 26] to detect anomalies between the
claimed identity of a webpage and its features [38]. However, since
phishing attacks are continuously evolving, these heuristics are
Figure 1: Whitelisted pages are granted based on their URLs.
The remaining pages are compared to the whitelisted pages
by a learnt visual similarity metric. Pages that that are too
similar are rejected, which even allows detecting zero-day
phishing pages with new visual appearances.
subject to continuous change and might not be effective in detect-
ing future attacks [19, 54] (e.g. more than two-thirds of phishing
sites in 3Q 2019 used SSL protection [2], its absence formerly was
used as a feature to detect phishing pages [38]).
Since the key factor in deceiving users is the high visual similarity
between phishing pages and their corresponding legitimate ones,
detecting such similarity was used in many previous detection
studies [19]. In these methods, a whitelist of pages is maintained
(domain names and screenshots), and whenever a user visits a page
that is not in the whitelist, its content is compared against the
whitelist’s ones. If a high visual similarity is detected, it is then
classified as a phishing page as it impersonates one of the whitelist’s
ones. Similarity-based methods have the advantage of not relying
on heuristics that are likely to evolve and instead they rely on the
strong incentive of the adversary to design pages that are similar
to trustworthy websites. This makes them less prone to an arms
race between defenders and attackers.
These efforts still have limitations. First, their whitelists are too
small in both the number of websites and pages per website (e.g.
4-14 websites in [7, 11, 13, 32, 33], less than 10 pages in [14, 48, 53],
41 pages in [34]) which makes them able to detect attacks against
these few pages only. Second, existing approaches fall short in de-
tecting zero-day phishing pages that target the same whitelisted
websites but with new unseen visual appearances, as they perform a
page-to-page image matching between a previously found phishing
page and its legitimate counterpart [5, 14, 19, 25, 39]. Consequently,
attackers can bypass detection by using other pages from the tar-
geted websites or by crafting partially similar phishing pages with
different background pictures, advertisements, or layout [8, 14, 39].
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Contribution. Our work targets the above limitations and fo-
cuses on improving the image-based visual similarity detection and
shows that it can be used for zero-day phishing detection. First, we
present WhitePhish, the largest dataset to date (155 whitelisted
websites with 9363 screenshots), that we constructed to mitigate
the limitations of previously published datasets, facilitate visual
phishing detection and improve the ecological validity when eval-
uating phishing detection frameworks.
Second, we proposeWhiteNet, a similarity-based detectionmodel
that is the first to utilize a deep learning approach (in particular,
triplet convolutional neural networks) to learn amore robust vi-
sual similarity metric between any two same-website webpages’
screenshots, instead of relying on one-to-one matching.WhiteNet
outperforms prior work by a large margin and detects zero-
day phishing pages. A conceptual overview of our method is de-
picted in Figure 1; we show a whitelist of websites in a learnt feature
space in which same-website pages have higher proximity. Addi-
tionally, phishing webpages have high visual similarity and closer
embeddings to the whitelist, thus, they would be classified as phish-
ing. Contrarily, websites that are outside the whitelist have genuine
identities and relatively different features.
2 PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we briefly summarize the related similarity-based
phishing detection approaches, then we introduce our threat model.
2.1 Related Work
2.1.1 Page-based similarity approaches. The similarity between
phishing and whitelisted pages can be inferred by comparing HTML
features; Huang et al. [18] extracted features that represent the
text content and style (e.g. most frequent words, font name and
color, etc.), which they used to compare pages against whitelisted
identities. Similarly, Zhang et al. [54] used TF-IDF to find lexical
signatures which they used to find the legitimate website domain
by a search engine. Besides, Liu et al. [28] segmented a webpage
to blocks based on HTML visual cues and compared the layout of
two pages by matching blocks. Also, Rosiello et al. [41] used Docu-
ment Object Model (DOM) comparison, and Mao et al. [33] used
Cascading Style Sheet (CSS) comparison. However, these methods
fail if attackers used images or embedded objects instead of HTML
text [14]. They are also vulnerable to code obfuscation techniques
where a different code produces similar rendered images [14, 25].
2.1.2 Image-based similarity approaches. Consequently, another
line of work (which we adopt) infers similarity directly from ren-
dered screenshots. As examples, Fu et al. [14] used EarthMoverâĂŹs
Distance (EMD) to compute the similarity between low-resolution
screenshots, which Zhang et al. [53] also used along with textual
features. However, this required the images to have the same aspect
ratio [25], which is a constraint we do not impose. Also, Lam et
al. [25] used layout similarity by matching the screenshots’ segmen-
tation blocks. However, the proposed segmentation approach is
limited when segmenting pages with complex backgrounds [5]. Our
approach does not suffer from these limitations since we use an end-
to-end framework to represent images rather than a heuristic-based
one. In addition, Chen et al. [8] approximated human perception
with Gestalt theory to determine the visual similarity of two web-
pages’ layouts with slight differences (e.g. an addition or removal
of a block). They evaluated their approach on only 12-16 legitimate
pages and their corresponding spoofed ones. In contrast to these
approaches, we generalize the similarity detection and show that
our method is not limited to phishing pages with a similar layout
to the corresponding whitelisted ones.
Discriminative keypoint features were often used in phishing
detection. As examples, Afroz et al. [1] used Scale-Invariant Fea-
ture Transform (SIFT) to match logos, while Rao et al. [39] used
Speeded-Up Robust Features (SURF) to match screenshots. Simi-
larly, Bozkir et al. [5] used Histogram of Oriented Gradients (HOG),
Chen et al. [7] used Contrast Context Histogram (CCH), and Malisa
et al. [31] used Oriented FAST and rotated BRIEF (ORB) to detect
mobile applications spoofing. Besides, Medvet et al. [34] used color
histograms and 2D Haar wavelet transform of screenshots. How-
ever, in recent years, CNNs were shown to significantly outperform
local and hand-crafted features in computer vision tasks [23, 43].
Thus, our work is the first to use deep learning in pixel-based
visual similarity phishing detection and to study the adversarial
perturbations against such models.
Chang et al. [6] and Dunlop et al. [13] used logo extraction to
determine a website’s identity and then used the Google search
engine to find corresponding domains. These approaches assumed
a fixed location for the website logo which could be bypassed. Con-
trary to these approaches, we use a learning-based identification of
the discriminating visual cues and study the performance against
shifts in location.
Woodbridge et al. [50] used Siamese CNNs to detect visually
similar URLs by training on URLs rendered as images. In contrast,
we propose a visual similarity metric based on screenshots instead
of URL pairs, with further optimizations adapting to the harder
problem, which goes beyond homoglyph attacks.
Additionally, despite previous efforts, our work explores new ter-
ritory in similarity detection research with more generalization and
fewer constraints; previous methods aim to form a match between
a found phishing attempt and its correspondent real page assuming
a highly similar layout and content. Therefore, a phishing page
targeting the same website but is different from the whitelisted
pages could go undetected. In addition, same-website pages show a
lot of variations in background pictures and colors which attackers
might exploit to continuously create new pages. Thus, our model
and dataset collection do not rely on page-to-page matching, but on
learning a similarity metric between any two same-website pages,
even with different contents, to proactively generalize to partially
similar, obfuscated, and unseen zero-day pages.
2.2 Threat Model
We consider phishing pages targeting the collected large whitelisted
websites. We assume that the attacker would be motivated to tar-
get websites that are widely known and trusted, therefore, high
coverage of phishing pages could be achieved by the collected
whitelist. We assume that the attacker could craft the phishing
page to be fully or partially similar to any page from the targeted
websites (not only to pages in the whitelist), therefore, we relax the
page-to-page matching and test on phishing pages that were not
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seen in the whitelisted website pages. We study other evasion tech-
niques (hand-crafted and white-box adversarial perturbations) that
introduce small imperceptible noise to the phishing page to reduce
the similarity to the targeted page that might be contained in the
whitelist. For all these attempts, we assume that the adversary has
an incentive to create seemingly trusted pages by not introducing
very perceptible noise on the page that might affect the perceived
design quality or the website’s identity (e.g. large changes to logos
and color themes).
3 ANALYSES AND LIMITATIONS OF
PUBLISHED DATASETS
In this section, we discuss public datasets and their limitations
along with the contributions of the WhitePhish dataset.
Unfortunately, only a small number of datasets for the phish-
ing detection task using screenshots are publicly available. One of
these is DeltaPhish [10] for detecting phishing pages hosted within
compromised legitimate websites. The dataset consists of groups
having the same domain, where each group contains one phishing
page and a few other benign pages from the compromised hosting
website. Thus, the legitimate examples only cover the hosting web-
sites, not the websites spoofed by the phishing pages. Consequently,
this dataset is not suitable for similarity-based detection. Moreover,
we observed that a large percentage of phishing pages’ screenshots
in this dataset are duplicates since PhishTank1 reports do not neces-
sarily contain unique screenshots. We also found that the legitimate
and phishing examples had different designs as phishing examples
generally consisted of login forms with few page elements, while
legitimate examples contained more details. This could cause the
trained model to be biased to these design changes and, thus, could
fail when tested with legitimate pages with login forms.
The Phish-IRIS dataset [11] for similarity-based detection con-
sists of phishing pages collected from PhishTank targeting 14 web-
sites and an “other” class collected from the Alexa top 300 websites2
representing legitimate examples outside the whitelist. However,
this dataset has a limited number of whitelisted websites, and the
screenshots of the whitelist were taken only from phishing reports
which skews the dataset towards poorly designed phishing pages.
WhitePhish contributions. Based on the previously mentioned
limitations, we collected the WhitePhish dataset that facilitates
similarity-based detection approaches and closes the following gaps:
1) we increased the size of the whitelist to detect more phishing
attacks. 2) we collected a phishing webpage corpus with removing
duplicity in screenshots. 3) instead of only training on phishing
pages, we also collected legitimate pages of the targeted websites
with different page designs and views (i.e. training whitelist). 4) the
dataset is not built on a page-to-page basis but on a per-website
basis; the whitelist contains screenshots from the whole website,
phishing pages that target the whitelisted website are considered
even if their counterparts are not found in the whitelist. 5) we col-
lected a legitimate test set of websites (i.e. non-whitelisted domains)
that limits bias as far as possible (e.g. login forms should also be
well represented in this test set).
1https://www.phishtank.com/
2https://www.alexa.com
Unlike previous work, we extend the visual similarity to zero-day
phishing pages that target the whitelisted websites but were not
seen in the training whitelist. Thus, we checked that the collected
phishing pages are different in terms of simple pixel-wise similarity
from the targeted whitelisted websites’ pages. To denote pixel-
wise similarity, we used the distances between the pre-trained
VGG16 visual representation instead of naive pixel comparison. We
computed the minimum distances between the phishing pages and
the corresponding targeted website. As a reference, we compared
them to the distances between the legitimate test set (other websites)
and the whitelist. If the phishing pages had similar counterparts
in the whitelist, they would have considerably smaller distances to
the whitelist compared to other benign pages. However, as can be
seen from the two histograms in Figure 2, the distance ranges in
both sets are comparable with high overlap. Hence, the phishing
pages are different from the training whitelisted websites’ ones and
can be used to evaluate the performance on future phishing pages
with new appearances.
4 THEWHITEPHISH DATASET
In this section, we show how we constructed WhitePhish.
Phishing pages. To collect the phishing examples, we crawled
and saved the screenshots of the active verified phishing pages from
PhishTank which yielded 10250 pages. We observed that the same
phishing screenshot design could be found with multiple URLs, so
we manually inspected the saved screenshots to remove duplicates
in addition to removing not found and broken URLs. Having non-
duplicated screenshots (i.e. unique visual appearance) is important
to have an accurate error estimate and to have a disjoint and non-
overlapping training and test splits. After filtering, the phishing
set contained 1195 phishing pages targeting 155 websites. We ob-
served that phishing pages targeting one website have differences
in elements’ locations, colors, scales, text languages and designs
(including previous websites’ versions), therefore, the phishing set
can be used to test the model’s robustness to these variations. We
also found that some phishing pages are poorly designed with little
similarity to the overall design of the targeted website, in addition
to having templates that cannot be found in the website but in other
applications (e.g. Microsoft Word or Excel files). Such dissimilar
28 780 1532 2284 2961
Distance
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 (%
)
Phish
Legit
Figure 2: The distances histogram between the pre-trained
VGG16 features of the phishing test set and the targetedweb-
site in the training whitelist (red), in comparison with the
ones between the benign test set and the whitelist (blue).
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examples were excluded from previous work (such as [33]), how-
ever, we included all found pages for completeness and to provide
a rich dataset for future research. Examples of these variations are
in Appendix B. Additionally, the majority of these phishing pages
belonged to a small subset of these 155 websites (a histogram is
in Appendix B), therefore, even though whitelisting methods can-
not detect attacks against non-whitelisted websites, high coverage
of phishing pages could be achieved by including a few websites in
the whitelist.
Targeted legitimate websites’ pages. Besides collecting phishing
webpages, we collected legitimate pages from those 155 targeted
websites to work as a visual whitelist. Instead of only gathering the
legitimate counterparts of the found phishing pages as typically
done in previous work, we crawled all internal links that were
parsed from the HTML file of the homepage. As a result, not all
phishing pages have corresponding similar legitimate pages in this
whitelist. We saved all webpages from the website to get different
page designs, possible login forms, and different languages to make
the similarity model trained with this dataset robust against these
differences. For these 155 websites, we collected 9363 screenshots,
where the number of collected screenshots for eachwebsite depends
on the number of hyperlinks found in the homepage.
Top-ranked legitimate websites’ pages. Furthermore, we queried
the top 500 ranked websites from Alexa, the top 100 websites from
SimilarWeb3, in addition to the top 100 websites in categories most
prone to phishing such as banking, finance, and governmental
services. In total, we collected a list of 400 websites from SimilarWeb.
From these lists, we excluded the 155 websites we collected from the
phishing pages’ targets, and then we downloaded the screenshots
of the top ≈60 websites (non-overlapping) from each list.
Training and test pages split. We have three data components: a
training whitelist of legitimate pages, phishing pages targeting the
websites in the whitelist, and legitimate/benign test examples of
websites outside the whitelist (i.e. different domains). Our objective
is to differentiate the phishing pages from other benign examples
based on their similarity to the whitelist.
To train the model, we used the first legitimate set that we built
from the phishing pages’ targets (155 websites) as a whitelist that
is used only in training. We used a subset of the phishing examples
in training as a form of augmentation in order to learn to associate
the dissimilar examples to their targets. We do not train on any
other legitimate websites (i.e. domains) outside the whitelist.
To test the model, we used the rest of the phishing set. In addition,
we constructed a legitimate test set of 683 benign examples from the
top-ranked websites’ pages that we crawled (with domains different
from the whitelist); we selected 3-7 screenshots from each website.
In order not to have a biased dataset with inherent differences
between the legitimate and phishing test sets that might give opti-
mistic or spurious results, we rigorously constructed the legitimate
test set such that it contains an adequate number of forms and
categories that are used in phishing attacks (e.g. banks, Software as
a Service (SaaS), and payment [2]). With a well-balanced test set,
we can accurately evaluate the similarity model performance and
whether it can find the website identity instead of relying on other
3https://www.similarweb.com/
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
Percentiles of lists
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
In
st
an
ce
s c
ov
er
ag
e 
(%
)
Alexa
SimilarWeb
Both lists
Figure 3: Percentage of phishing instances whose targets are
covered by ascending percentiles of other lists.
unrelated features such as the page layout (e.g. having forms). Ad-
ditionally, we included other categories (histogram in Appendix B)
to have high coverage of websites users might face.
Whitelist analysis. In addition to the whitelist we built from
PhishTank, we also examined other sources for building whitelists
without needing to crawl phishing data. This could help in tak-
ing proactive steps to protect websites that might be attacked in
the future if the adversary decided to avoid detection by targeting
other websites than the ones which have been already known to be
vulnerable. In order for the attacks to succeed, attackers have an
incentive to target websites that are trusted and known for a large
percentage of users, therefore, we built our analysis on the top 500
websites from Alexa, and the top 400 websites from SimilarWeb
in categories most prone to phishing. To evaluate whether or not
these lists can represent the targets that might be susceptible to
attacks, we computed the intersection between them and the Phish-
Tank whitelist. Figure 3 shows cumulative percentages of phishing
instances whose targets are included in ascending percentiles of
the Alexa, SimilarWeb, and the concatenation of both lists. We
found that including both lists covered around 88% of the phishing
instances we collected from PhishTank, which indicates that the
top-ranked websites are relevant for constructing whitelists. Addi-
tionally, SimilarWeb list covered more instances than Alexa list, we
accounted that for the fact that the former was built from categories
such as banks, SaaS and payment, in addition to the general top
websites. We, therefore, conclude that this categorization approach
is more effective in forming potential whitelists since important
categories are less likely to change in future attacks.
5 WHITENET
As we presented in Figure 1, similarity-based phishing detection is
based on whether there is a high visual similarity between a visited
webpage to any of the whitelisted websites, while having a different
domain. If the visited page was found to be not similar enough to
the whitelist, it would be classified as a legitimate page with a
genuine identity. Therefore, our objective can be considered as a
similarity learning problem rather than a multi-class classification
between whitelist’s websites and an “other” class. Including a subset
of “other” websites in training with a multi-class classification
method could cause the model to fail at test time when testing
with new websites. Additionally, instead of the typically used page-
to-page correspondence, we aim to learn the similarity between
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Figure 4: An overview ofWhiteNet. We utilize triplet networks with convolutional sub-networks to learn similarity between
same-website screenshots (same shaped symbols), and dissimilarity between different-website screenshots. Our network has
two training stages; first, training is performed with uniform random sampling from all whitelist’s screenshots. Second, train-
ing is performed by iteratively finding hard examples according to the model’s latest checkpoint.
any two same-website pages despite having different content (e.g.
colors, images, and layout).
Motivated by these reasons, we treated the problem as a similar-
ity learning problem with deep learning using Siamese or triplet
networks which have been successfully used in applications such
as face verification [46], signature verification [12], and character
recognition [22]. In each of these applications, the identity of an
image is compared against a database and the model verifies if this
identity is matched with any of those in the database. They have
been also used in the tasks of few-shots learning or one-shot learn-
ing [22] by learning a good representation that encapsulates the
identity with few learning examples. These reasons make this deep
learning paradigm suitable for similarity-based phishing detection.
Our network, WhiteNet, adopts the triplet network paradigm
with three shared convolutional networks. We show an overview
of the training ofWhiteNet in Figure 4 which consists of two stages:
in the first stage, training is performed on all screenshots with a
random sampling of examples. The second training stage fine-tunes
the model weights by iteratively training on hard examples that
were wrongly classified by the model’s last checkpoint according
to the distance between the embeddings. By learning these deep
embeddings, we build a profile for each website that encapsulates
its identity, which would enable us to detect zero-day webpages
that are not contained in the whitelist database. The rest of this
section illustrates in more detail each aspect of theWhiteNet model.
5.1 Triplet Networks
The Siamese networks are two networks with shared weights
trained with the goal of learning a feature representation of the
input such that similar images have higher proximity in the new fea-
ture space than different images. The sub-networks shares weights
and parameters and the weight updates are mirrored for each of
them, the sub-networks are then joined with a loss function that
minimizes the distance of similar objects’ embeddings while maxi-
mizing the distance of dissimilar objects’ ones [12].
The triplet network, which we used in WhiteNet, extends this
approach; it was initially used in the FaceNet system [42] to learn
an embedding for the face verification task. This type of architec-
tures performs the training on three images, an anchor image, a
positive image whose identity is the same as the anchor, and a neg-
ative image with a different identity than the anchor. The overall
objective of the network is to learn a feature space in which the
distance between the positive and anchor images’ embeddings is
smaller than the distance between the anchor and negative im-
ages’ ones. This is achieved by minimizing the loss function that is
Loss =
N∑
i
max( ∥f(xai ) − f (x
p
i )∥22 − ∥f(xai ) − f (xni )∥22 + α , 0 )
where: f (x) represents the embedding space (produced by a
shared network), (xai ,x
p
i ,x
n
i ) is a set of possible triplets (anchor,
positive, and negative), and α is a margin that is enforced between
positive and negative pairs which achieves a relative distance con-
straint. The loss penalizes the triplet examples in which the distance
between the anchor and positive images is not smaller by at least
the margin α than the distance between the anchor and negative
images. In our problem, the positive image is a screenshot of the
same website as the sampled anchor, and similarly, the negative
image is a screenshot of a website that is different from the anchor.
For the shared network, we used the VGG16 (as a standard ar-
chitecture) with ImageNet pre-training initialization [45]. We used
all layers excluding the top fully connected layers, we then added
a new convolution layer of size 5x5 with 512 filters, with ReLU
activations, and initialized randomly with HE initialization [16].
Instead of using a fully connected layer after the convolution layers,
we used a Global Max Pooling (GMP) layer that better fits the task
of detecting possible local discriminating patterns in patches such
as logos. To match the VGG image size, all screenshots were resized
to 224x224 with the RGB channels.
5.2 Triplet Sampling
Since there are a large number of possible combinations of triplets,
the training is usually done based on sampling or mining of triplets
instead of forming all combinations. However, random sampling
could produce a large number of triplets that easily satisfy the con-
dition due to having zero or small loss which would not contribute
to training. Therefore, mining of hard examples was previously
used in FaceNet to speed-up convergence [42].
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Therefore, as we show in Figure 4, our training process has two
training stages. In the first stage, we used a uniform random sam-
pling of triplets to cover most combinations. After training the
network with random sampling, we then fine-tuned the model by
iteratively finding the hard examples to form a new training subset.
First, we randomly sample a query set representing one screen-
shot from each website, then with the latest model checkpoint, we
compute the L2 distance between the embeddings of the query set
and all the rest of training screenshots. In this feature space, the
distance between a query image and any screenshot from the same
website should ideally be closer than the distance from the same
query image to any image from different websites. Based on this,
we can find the examples that have the largest error in distance.
Hence, we retrieve the one example from the same website that
had the largest distance to the query (hard positive example), and
the one example from a different website that had the smallest
distance to the query (hard negative example). We then form a new
training subset by taking the hard examples along with the sampled
query set altogether, and we continue the training process with
triplet sampling on this new subset. For the same query set, we
repeat the process of finding a new subset of hard examples for
a defined number of iterations for further fine-tuning. Finally, to
avoid overfitting to a query set that might have outliers, we repeat
the overall process by sampling a new query set and selecting the
training subsets for this new query set accordingly.
This hard example mining framework can be considered as an
approximation to a training scheme where a query image is paired
with screenshots from all websites and a Softmin function is ap-
plied on top of the pairwise distances with a supervised label, how-
ever, this would not scale well with the number of websites in the
whitelist, and therefore it is not tractable in our case as a single
training example would have 155 pairs (whitelist websites).
5.3 Prediction
At test time, the closest screenshot in distance to a phishing test
page targeting a website should ideally be a screenshot of the same
website. Therefore, the decision is not done based on all triplets
comparison but it can be done by finding the screenshot with the
minimum distance to the query image. To this end, we use the
shared network to compute the embeddings then we compute the
L2 distance between the embeddings of the test screenshot and all
training screenshots. After computing the pairwise distances, the
test screenshot is assigned to the website of the screenshot that
has the minimum distance. This step could identify the website
targeted if the test page is a phishing page.
As depicted in Figure 1, if the minimum distance between a page
and the whitelist is smaller than a defined threshold, the page would
be classified as a phishing page that tries to impersonate one of
the whitelisted websites by having a high visual similarity. On the
other hand, if the distance is not small enough, the page would be
classified as a legitimate page with a genuine identity. Therefore,
we apply a threshold on the minimum distance for classification.
6 EVALUATION
In this section, we first show the implementation details ofWhiteNet
and its performance, then we present further experiments to evalu-
ate the robustness of WhiteNet.
6.1 WhiteNet: Final Model
Evaluation metrics. Since our method is based on the visual sim-
ilarity of a phishing page to websites in the whitelist, we computed
the percentage of correct matches between a phishing page and
its targeted website. We also calculated the overall accuracy of
the binary classification between legitimate test pages and phish-
ing pages at different distance thresholds to calculate the Receiver
Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve area.
Implementation details. To train the network, we used Adam
optimizer [21] with momentum values of β1 = 0.9, β2 = 0.999 and
a learning rate of 0.00002 with a decay of 1% every 300 mini-batches
where we used a batch size of 32 triplets. We set the margin (α )
in the triplet loss to 2.2. The first stage of triplet sampling had
21,000 mini-batches, followed by hard examples fine-tuning, which
had 18,000 mini-batches divided as follows: we sampled 75 random
query sets, for each, we find a training subset which will be used
for 30 minibatches, then we repeat this step 8 times. We used 40%
of the phishing examples in training (added to the targeted website
pages and used normally in triplet sampling) and used the other
60% for the test set. We used the same training/test split in the two
phases of training. We tested the model with the legitimate test
set consisting of 683 screenshots; these domains were only used in
testing since we train the model on whitelisted domains only (and
partially their spoofed pages).
Performance. Using WhiteNet, 81% of the phishing test pages
were matched to their correct website using the top-1 closest screen-
shot, while the top-5 match is 88.6%. After computing the correct
matches, we computed the false positive and true positive rates at
different thresholds (where the positive class is phishing) which
yielded a ROC curve area of 0.9879 (at a cut-off of 1% false positives,
the partial ROC area is 0.0087) outperforming the examined models
and re-implemented visual similarity approaches which we show
in the following sections.
6.2 Ablation Study
Given the results of WhiteNet, this sub-section investigates the
effects of different parameters in the model, we summarize our
experiments in Table 1 which shows the top-1 match and the ROC
area for each model in comparison with the final one (see Appen-
dix A for the ROC curves). We first evaluated the triplet network by
experimenting with Siamese network as an alternative. We used a
similar architecture to the one used in [22] with two convolutional
networks and a supervised label of 1 if the two sampled screenshots
are from the same website, and 0 otherwise. The network was then
trained with binary cross-entropy loss. We also examined both L1
and L2 as the distance function used in the triplet loss. Besides, we
inspected different architecture’s parameters regarding the shared
sub-network including the added convolution layer, and the final
layer that is used as the embedding vector where we experimented
with Global Average Pooling (GAP) [27], fully connected layer, and
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taking all spatial locations by flattening the final feature map. In
addition to VGG16, we evaluated ResNet50 as well [17]. We also
studied the effect of the second training phase of hard examples
training by comparing it with a model that was only trained by
random sampling. As can be seen from Table 1, the triplet network
outperformed the Siamese network. Also, the second training phase
of hard examples improved the performance, which indicates the
importance of this step to reach convergence as previously reported
in [42]. We also show that the used parameters inWhiteNet outper-
form the other studied parameters. Motivated by the observation
that some phishing pages had poor quality designs and were differ-
ent from their targeted websites (see Appendix B for examples), we
studied the robustness of WhiteNet to the ratio of phishing exam-
ples seen in training. We, thus, reduced the training phishing set to
only 20% and tested with the other 80%, which slightly decreased
the top-1 match (mostly on these different examples).
6.3 Whitelist Expansion
In addition to the PhishTank whitelist gathered from phishing re-
ports, we studied other sources of whitelists as per the analysis
presented earlier in our dataset collection procedure. We then stud-
ied the robustness of WhiteNet’s performance when adding new
websites to the training whitelist. To that end, we categorized the
training websites to three lists (as shown in Figure 5), the Phish-
Tank whitelist, a subset containing 32 websites from SimilarWeb
top 400 list (418 screenshots), a subset containing 38 websites (576
screenshots) from Alexa top 500 list. Since we have phishing pages
for the websites in the PhishTank whitelist only, the other two lists
can be used in training as distractors to the performance on the
phishing examples. When training on one of these additional lists,
we remove its websites from the legitimate test set yielding test
sets of 562 and 573 screenshots in the case of adding SimilarWeb
and Alexa lists respectively.
As shown in Table 2, when adding new websites to the training
whitelist, the performance of the classification (indicated by the
ROC area and the top-1 match) decreased. However, this decrease
in performance was relatively slight, which indicates the robustness
of WhiteNet to adding a few more websites to training.
Su
b-
ne
tw
or
k
Ad
de
d
La
ye
r
La
st
La
ye
r
N
et
w
or
k
ty
pe
D
ist
an
ce
Sa
m
pl
in
g
%P
hi
sh
in
g
To
p-
1
M
at
ch
RO
C
A
re
a
VGG16 Conv 5x5(512) GMP Triplet L2 2 stages 40% 81.03% 0.9879
Siamese 75.31% 0.8871
FC (1024) Siamese L1 64.8% 0.655
L1 73.91% 0.9739
GAP 68.61% 0.6449
FC (1024) 78.94% 0.8517
Flattening 80.05% 0.8721
Conv 3x3(512) 80.19% 0.9174
No new layer 79.91% 0.8703
ResNet50 No new layer 78.52% 0.8526
Random 75.3% 0.9477
20% 74.37% 0.9899
Table 1: A summary of the ablation study. Row 1 is the fi-
nally usedmodel, cells indicated by " " denotes the same cell
value of row 1 (WhiteNet).
6.4 Comparison with Prior Work and Baselines
Furthermore, we compared WhiteNet with alternative approaches
that we re-implemented on the WhitePhish dataset. In recent years,
deep learning and CNNs have been demonstrated to achieve a
breakthrough over local and hand-crafted features (used in pre-
vious work) on many benchmarks [23]. Moreover, off-the-shelf
pre-trained CNNs features (even without fine-tuning) have been
shown to outperform local features inmany tasks [29, 43, 52]. There-
fore, we first compareWhiteNet’s embeddings to the embeddings
of two off-the-shelf CNNs: VGG16 and ResNet50. Also, since our
work is the first to utilize deep learning, the pre-trained CNNs
provide a baseline for deep learning approaches. As we show in Ta-
ble 3, WhiteNet outperforms these two baselines with a significant
performance gain.
To provide additional evidence, we re-implemented the methods
of phishing detection using SURF matching from [39], HOG match-
ing from [5], and ORB matching from [31] which reported that ORB
is more suited for the logo detection task than SIFT. Unlike previ-
ous work, our approach and dataset do not rely on page-to-page
matching, thus, not all phishing pages have legitimate counterparts
in the training whitelist. This limits the applicability of methods
Figure 5: The three main lists used in training, the whitelist
collected fromPhishTank, a subset ofAlexa list, and a subset
of SimilarWeb list.
Experiment Top-1 Match ROC Area
PhishTank whitelist (155 websites) 81.03% 0.9879
Add SimilarWeb list (32+155 websites) 78.3% 0.9764
Add Alexa list (38+155 websites) 78.1% 0.9681
Table 2: A summary of our experiments when adding more
websites from Alexa and SimilarWeb lists to training.
Method Top-1 Match ROC Area
WhiteNet 81.03% 0.9879
VGG16 51.32% 0.8134
ResNet50 32.21% 0.7008
ORB 24.9% 0.6922
HOG 27.61% 0.58
SURF 6.55% 0.488
Table 3: Our experiments to compare WhiteNet’s perfor-
mance against prior methods and alternative baselines.
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(a)WhiteNet (b)WhiteNet
(c) VGG16 (d) VGG16
Figure 6: t-SNE visualizations ofWhiteNet’s embeddings (first row) compared with the pre-trained VGG16 ones as a baseline
(second row). Figures (a) and (c) show whitelist’s webpages color-coded by websites. Figures (b) and (d) show whitelist’s web-
pages (blue) and their phishing pages (red and orange) in comparison with legitimate test pages outside the whitelist (green).
that are based on layout segmentation and explicit block matching
(such as [25]). Nevertheless, HOG descriptors, which we compare to,
were used to represent the page layout in [5]. As shown in Table 3,
the use of pre-trained CNNs (in particular VGG16) does indeed
outperform the other baselines. In all of our experiments, similar
to WhiteNet training for a fair comparison, 40% of the phishing set
was added to the whitelist.
This analysis demonstrates that previous image matching meth-
ods are not efficient on our dataset containing phishing pages whose
contents and visual appearances were not seen in the whitelist
(as shown later in subsection 7.1). Additionally, it shows that pre-
trained CNNs are not adequate and further optimization to find the
discriminating cues, as done in WhiteNet, is needed.
6.5 Embeddings Visualization
WhiteNet produces a feature vector (dimensions: 512) for each
screenshot that represents an encoding that resulted from mini-
mizing the triplet loss. In this learned feature space, same-website
screenshots should be in closer proximity compared with screen-
shots from different websites. To verify this, we used t-Distributed
Stochastic Neighbor Embedding (t-SNE) [30] to reduce the dimen-
sions of the embeddings vectors to a two-dimensional set. We show
the visualization’s results in Figure 6 in which we compare the
embeddings of WhiteNet with pre-trained VGG16 ones (as the best
performing baseline). We first visualized the embeddings of the
training whitelist’s webpages categorized by websites as demon-
strated in Figure 6a and Figure 6c for WhiteNet and VGG16 respec-
tively. As can be observed, the learned embeddings show higher
inter-class separation between websites in the case of WhiteNet
when compared with VGG16. Additionally, Figure 6b and Figure 6d
show the training whitelist’s pages in comparison with phishing
and legitimate test ones for WhiteNet and VGG16 respectively. For
successful phishing detection, phishing pages should have smaller
distances to whitelist’s pages than legitimate test pages, which is
more satisfied in the case of WhiteNet than VGG16.
6.6 Distance Threshold Selection
To determine a suitable distance/similarity threshold for the binary
classification between phishing and legitimate test sets, we split
the phishing and legitimate hold-out sets to validation and test
sets. We computed the minimum distances of both of them to the
training whitelist. Figure 7a shows the two density histograms
and the fitted Gaussian Probability Density Functions (PDF) of
the minimum distance for the validation sets of both classes. The
vertical line (at ≈8) represents a threshold value with an equal
error rate. Additionally, Figure 7b shows the true and false positive
rates of the test sets over different thresholds where the indicated
threshold is the same one deduced from Figure 7a, which achieves
≈93% true positive rate at ≈4% false positive rate.
6.7 Robustness and Security Evaluation
To test the robustness of WhiteNet, we define two models for eva-
sion attacks. In the first one, we study how susceptibleWhiteNet
is to small changes in the input (e.g. change of color, noise, and
position). In the second one, we assume a white-box attack where
the adversary has full access to the target model and the dataset
used in training (including the closest point to the phishing page).
In both models, we assume that the attacker’s goal is to violate
the target model’s integrity (in our case: similarity detection to the
targeted website) by crafting phishing pages that show differences
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Figure 7: Distance threshold selection. (a) shows a density
histogram of the minimum distances between the phish-
ing (red) and legitimate (blue) validation sets to the training
whitelist. (b) shows the true and false positive rates of the
test sets over thresholds, the vertical green line marks the
threshold from (a).
from their corresponding original pages that might be included in
the whitelist. However, we assume that the adversary is motivated
to not introduce very perceivable degradation in the design quality
for his phishing page to seem trusted and succeed in luring users.
Performance against hand-crafted perturbations. We studied 7
types of perturbations [51] that we applied to the phishing test set
(without retraining or data augmentation): blurring, brightening,
darkening, Gaussian noise, salt and pepper noise, occlusion by
insertion of boxes, and shifting. Table 4 demonstrates an example
of each of these changes along with the corresponding relative
decrease in performance. Our findings revealed that the matching
accuracy and the ROC area dropped slightly (by up to ≈4.3% and
≈1.8% respectively) for the imperceptible noise, while it dropped
by up to ≈6.7% and ≈5% respectively for the stronger noise that we
assume that it is less likely to be used. Further improvement could
be achieved with data augmentation during training.
Adversarial perturbations. Another direction for evasion attacks
is crafting adversarial perturbations with imperceptible noise that
would change the model decision when added to the input test
points [24]. There is a lot of work towards fixing the evasion prob-
lem [3], however, adversarial perturbations are well-known for
classification models. In contrast, WhiteNet is based on a metric
learning approach that, at test time, is used to compute distances
to the training points. We are not aware of any prior adversarial
perturbation methods on similarity-based networks and therefore
we propose and investigate an adaptation of the adversarial exam-
ple generation methods to our problem by using the Fast Gradient
Sign Method (FGSM) [15] defined as:
x˜ = x + ϵ sign(∇x J (θ ,x ,y))
where x˜ is the adversarial example, x is the original example, y is
the example’s target (0 in the triplet loss), θ denotes the model’s
parameters and J is the cost function used in training (triplet loss in
WhiteNet). Adapting this to our system, we used the phishing test
example as the anchor image, sampled an image from the same web-
site as the positive image (from the training whitelist), and an image
from a different website as the negative image. We then computed
the gradient with respect to the anchor image (the phishing test
image) to produce the adversarial example. We experimented with
two values for the noise magnitude (ϵ): 0.005 and 0.01, however, the
0.01 noise value is no longer imperceptible and causes noticeable
noise in the input (as shown in Figure 8). We also examined differ-
ent triplet sampling approaches when generating the adversarial
examples, in the first one, we select the positive image randomly
from the website’s images. However, since the matching decision is
based on the closest distance, in the second approach, we select the
closest point as the positive. We demonstrate our results in Table 5
where we show the relative decrease in the top-1 matching accu-
racy and the ROC AUC for each case averaged over 5 trials as we
randomly sample triplets for each example. Our results showed that
the matching accuracy and the AUC dropped by ≈10.5% and ≈6.5%
for the 0.005 noise and by ≈22.8% and ≈12.4% for the higher 0.01
noise. Also, targeting the closest example was similar to sampling a
random positive image. In addition, we tested an iterative approach
of adding a smaller magnitude of noise to the closest point at each
step (0.002 noise magnitude for 5 steps) which was comparable to
adding noise with a larger magnitude (0.01) at only one step.
We then performed adversarial training by fine-tuning the trained
WhiteNet for 3000 mini-batches on the same training data. In each
mini-batch, half of the triplets were adversarial examples generated
with FGSM with an epsilon value that is randomly generated from
a range of 0.003 and 0.01. After training, we again applied FGSM
Blurring Darkening Brightening Gaussian noise Salt and Pepper Occlusion Shift
Sigma=1.5 Gamma=1.3 Gamma=0.8 Var=0.01 Noise=5% Last quarter (-30,-30) pixels
Matching drop 1.38% 4.31% 1.72% 1.9% 2.07% 1.2% 3.09%
ROC AUC drop 0.17% 1.56% 0.36% 1.47% 1.79% 0.12% 0.86%
Sigma=3.5 Gamma=1.5 Gamma=0.5 Var=0.1 Noise=15% Second quarter (-50,-50) pixels
Matching drop 4.13% 5.68% 6.36% 6.71% 6.54% 5.34% 6.54%
ROC AUC drop 1.17% 2.65% 3.35% 2.65% 3.04% 4.99% 1.65%
Table 4: The studied hand-crafted perturbations applied to the phishing test set. The table shows the relative decrease in the
top-1 matching accuracy and ROC AUC with respect to the performance on the original phishing set.
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Figure 8: Adversarial examples generated with FGSM on the
triplet loss with ϵ = 0.01 (a) and ϵ = 0.005 (b).
on the phishing test set using the tuned model. As shown in the
last two columns of Table 5, the performance improved to reach a
comparable performance to the original set in the case of the 0.005
noise. These results demonstrate that WhiteNet, after retraining, is
robust against adversarial attacks with slightly added noise.
Evaluating different browsers. We studied the effect of the changes
caused by other browsers than the one we used to build the dataset
(Firefox) as an example of one of the factors that could be different
when deploying the system. Thus, we created a subset of 50 URLs
from 14 websites, and we used Firefox, Opera, Google Chrome,
Microsoft Edge, and Vivaldi browsers to take screenshots of these
pages of which we computed theWhiteNet’s embeddings. In Table 6,
we quantify the browsers’ changes by comparing the L2 differences
between Firefox’s embeddings (to match the dataset) and other
browsers’ ones, which we found smaller by at least ≈6.6x than
the differences caused by the slight hand-crafted perturbations (ap-
plied on Firefox screenshots) we previously showed in the first row
of Table 4 and demonstrated that they already had a small effect on
the performance. Additionally, some of these browser differences
were due to advertisement or color differences which are already
included in the constructed dataset (see Appendix B).
Model Epsilon (ϵ) Sampling Matching drop ROC AUC drop
Original
0.005 random 10.5% 6.47%
0.005 closest point 10.11% 6.07%
0.01 random 22.81% 12.35%
0.002 iterative 20.8% 12.05%
Retrained
0.005 random 2.54% 0.07%
0.01 random 9.78% 3.61%
Table 5: The relative performance decrease (with respect to
the original test set) of the FGSM adversarial examples.
Browser Chrome Edge Opera Vivaldi
0.278±0.54 0.23±0.75 0.271±0.21 0.41±0.57
Noise Blurring Gaussian Salt and Pepper Shift
4.92±2.71 2.73±1.02 6.80±2.24 5.43±2.36
Table 6: The L2 difference between Firefox screenshots’ em-
beddings and other browsers’ ones, compared to the L2 dif-
ference due to the studied slight perturbations.
6.8 Testing with New Crawled Data
Zero-day pages. To provide additional evidence for the efficacy
of WhiteNet in detecting zero-day pages, we crawled recent 950
PhishTank pages targeting the whitelist (examples in Appendix B)
using a different browser, machine, and screen size from the ones
used to collect the dataset to further test against possible variations.
We then tested the trained model with this new set (without addi-
tional training), and 93.25% were correctly matched (top-5: 96%),
compared to 81% (top-5: 88%) on the harder and more dissimilar
dataset’s phishing pages. See Appendix A for matching examples.
Top benignwebsites. To further test the false positives, we crawled
additional 2900 pages from Alexa top list (excluding all previously
crawled domains) and added them to the legitimate test set. We
then recomputed the ROC AUC on the new benign set against the
original phishing one, however, this had a very insignificant effect
on the ROC AUC (decreased by 0.0032%). This shows that our re-
sults of benign and phishing pages classification are generalizable
to bigger samples of benign websites.
7 DISCUSSION
We discuss the implications of the efficacy ofWhiteNet by showcas-
ing examples of phishing pages that were correctly detected, and
failure modes with both false positive and false negative examples.
7.1 Evaluating Successful Cases
We categorize the successfully classified phishing pages into three
main categories. The first one is the easily classified ones consisting
of exact or very close copying of a corresponding legitimate web-
page from the training whitelist. However, our model still showed
robustness to small variations such as the text language of login
forms (which shows an advantage over text-similarity methods),
small advertisements’ images changes, the addition or removal of
elements in the page, and changes in their locations. We observed
that these pages have approximately a minimum distance in the
range of 0-2 to the training set (as shown in the distances’ histogram
in Figure 7) and constitute around 25% of the correct matches. The
second category, which is relatively harder than the first one, is the
phishing webpages that look similar in style (e.g. location of ele-
ments and layout of the page) to training pages, however, they are
Ph
ish
in
g
te
st
Cl
os
es
tm
at
ch
Figure 9: Test phishing pages (first row) that were correctly
matched to the targeted websites (closest match from the
training set in the second row) with the closest pages having
a relatively similar layout but different colors and content.
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highly different in content (e.g. images, colors, and text). We show
examples of this second category in Figure 9. Similarly, these pages
correspond approximately to the distance range of 2-4 in Figure 7
and constitute around 35% of the correct matches.
Finally, the hardest category is the phishing pages showing dis-
parities in designwhen compared to the training examples as shown
in Figure 10. These pages had distances to the training set which
were higher than 4 and increased according to their differences and
they constitute around 40% of the correct matches. For example,
the first three columns show a match between pages with different
designs and elements’ locations. Also, the fourth phishing page has
a pop-up window that partially occludes information and changes
the page’s colors. The fifth phishing page is challenging as it does
not show the company logo, yet it was correctly matched to the
targeted website due to having other similar features. This suggests
that WhiteNet captures the look and feel of websites, which makes
it have an advantage over previous matching methods that relied
only on logo matching such as [1, 13]. The last two pages are highly
dissimilar to the matched page except for having the same logo and
other similar colors. Even though these examples could arguably
be easily recognized as phishing pages by users, they are more chal-
lenging to be detected based on similarity and therefore they were
excluded in previous studies such as [33], however, we included
them for completeness. This analysis shows the ability ofWhiteNet
to detect the similarity of phishing pages that are partially copied
or created with poor quality in addition to zero-day phishing pages
with no counterpart in the training whitelist, which all are possible
attempts to evade detection in addition to the ones we previously
discussed. We also show in Appendix A phishing examples target-
ing different websites that have highly similar colors but they were
correctly distinguished from each other.
Since these successful matches suggest that the logo of a page
plays an important factor in the matching decision, possible false
matches could happen if a benign page contains another web-
site logo. To evaluate this, we collected a benign subset of 125
pages (see Appendix B) that contain the logos of one or more of 9
whitelisted websites. These pages are articles about a website, or lo-
gin pages with other websites’ sign-in or sharing options. However,
only 3.07% of these pages were matched to the website whose logo
appears in the screenshot which indicates that the learnt profiles
incorporate more visual cues than logos only.
7.2 Evaluating Failure Modes
We also analysed the failure modes of the model including wrong
websites matches and false positives. We found that the highest mis-
matches are for phishing examples belonging to Facebook, Dropbox,
Microsoft one drive, Microsoft Office, and Adobe. We found that
these websites have many phishing pages with dissimilar appear-
ances (and poor designs) compared to the targeted websites, such
as the first three phishing pages targeting Facebook and Microsoft
Excel in Figure 11 (see also Appendix B for more examples). On
the other hand, phishing pages targeting banks had higher qual-
ity in copying and appeared plausible and similar to the targeted
websites making them have fewer mismatches (see Appendix A for
a histogram of wrong matches). To analyse how successful these
dissimilar pages in fooling users, we conducted an online study
where users were shown dissimilar and relatively similar phishing
pages and were asked to evaluate how trustworthy they seem based
only on their appearance. Only 3.02% said that they would trust the
dissimilar examples as opposed to 65.3% in the case of the relatively
similar ones (see Appendix B for examples used in the study).
We also found some phishing pages that used outdated designs
or earlier versions of certain login forms such as the fourth example
in Figure 11 (that is now changed entirely in Microsoft website)
and were, therefore, matched to a wrong website. This could be
improved by including earlier versions of websites in the training
data. Moreover, the last three examples in Figure 11 show some of
the main limitations. Since our whitelist contains a large number
of screenshots per website, we have many distractors of potentially
similar pages to the query screenshot, such as the fifth and sixth
examples in Figure 11 that were matched to similar screenshots
from different websites. We also found that some phishing pages
have pop-up windows that completely covered the logo and the
page’s colors and structure, and were then matched to pages with
darker colors such as the last example in Figure 11. The wrong
matches had generally higher distances than the correct matches
which could make them falsely classified as legitimate examples.
We also show false positive examples (benign test pages) that
had high similarity to pages from the training set in Figure 12 and
would be falsely classified as phishing pages based on the threshold
in Figure 7. We observed that pages with forms were harder to
identify as dissimilar to other pages with forms in the whitelist es-
pecially when having similar colors and layout, since they contain
Ph
ish
in
g
te
st
Cl
os
es
tm
at
ch
Figure 10: Examples of test phishing webpages that were correctly matched to the targeted websites despite having large
differences in layout and content.
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Figure 11: Examples of test phishing webpages that were matched to the wrong website from the training set.
few distinguishable and salient elements and they are otherwise
similar. We believe that using the screenshot’s text (possibly ex-
tracted by OCR), or more incorporation of the logo features along
with other visual cues by region-based convolution [40] could be
future possible model optimization directions to help reduce the
false positives and also improve the matching of hard examples.
Additionally, tackling the phishing problem has many orthogonal
aspects; while we focus on visual similarity to detect zero-day pages
and achieve a significant leap in performance, our approach could
still be used along with other whitelisting of trusted domains to
further reduce the false positives.
7.3 Deployment Considerations
We here discuss practical considerations for the deployment of
our system. First, regarding the required storage space and com-
putation time, our system does not require storing all screenshots
of the whitelist, as it suffices to store the embedding vectors of
screenshots (512-dimensional vectors). Also, the system is compu-
tationally feasible since the training whitelist embeddings can be
pre-computed, which at test time only leaves the relatively smaller
computations of the query image embedding and the L2 distances.
On a typical computer with 8 GByte RAM and Intel Core i7-8565U
1.80GHz processor, the average time for prediction was 1.1±0.7 sec-
onds which decreased to 0.46±0.25 seconds on a NVIDIA Tesla K80
GPU. If further speeding up is needed, the search for the closest
point could be optimized. Besides, the decision could only be com-
puted when the user attempts to submit information. We also show
in our analysis of possible perturbations that the learned similarity
is robust against partial removal of parts of the page, which sug-
gests that a page could be detected even if it was partially loaded.
Other deployment issues are the browser window size variations at
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Figure 12: False positive examples of the top closest legiti-
mate test pages to the training list.
test time which could be solved by fixing the size of the captured
screenshot. Another issue is the maintenance of the domain names
of the whitelist in case a website has changed its domain, which
could be solved by rolling updates of the whitelist without the need
to retrain. Additionally, we observed thatWhiteNet is robust against
small changes or updates in the website logo’s fonts or colors (e.g.
see Yahoo examples with different versions that were still correctly
detected in Appendix A). Larger or more significant changes (that
usually happen on long time intervals) might require retraining and
updating. Moreover, the current system and dataset are focusing
on Desktop browsers, however, the concept can be extended to
other devices (e.g. smartphones) which may require re-training.
Furthermore, our visual similarity model can either be used as a
standalone phishing detection model or, as the last defense mecha-
nism for zero-day pages along with other (potentially faster) listing
or heuristics approaches. Regarding the WhitePhish dataset, we
point out that the manual work in curating the dataset was mainly
for constructing unbiased and non-duplicated test sets, however,
it is less needed in collecting the training whitelist of legitimate
websites. This enables the automatic update of the whitelist to add
new websites when needed. Nevertheless, detecting duplicity can
be automated by finding the closest pages to the newly added one
based on pixel-wise features (such as VGG features).
8 CONCLUSION
As visual similarity is a key factor in detecting zero-day phishing
pages, in this work, we proposed a new framework for visual simi-
larity phishing detection. We presented a new dataset (WhitePhish)
that covers the largest visual whitelist so far (155 websites with
9363 screenshots) and overcomes the observed previous limitation.
Unlike previous work, instead of only matching a phishing page
to its legitimate counterpart, we generalize visual similarity to de-
tect unseen zero-day pages targeting the whitelisted websites. To
that end, we proposed WhiteNet that learns a visual profile of web-
sites by learning a similarity metric between any two same-website
pages despite having different contents. Based on our qualitative
analysis of the successful cases of WhiteNet, our network identi-
fied easy phishing pages (highly similar to pages in the whitelist),
and more importantly, phishing pages that were partially copied,
obfuscated, or not seen in the training whitelist. WhiteNet was
found to be robust against the range of possible evasion attacks and
perturbations that we studied, which makes our model less prone
to the fierce arms race between attackers and defenders.
12
In conclusion, our work introduces important contributions to
phishing detection research to learn a robust and proactive visual
similarity metric that demonstrates a leap in performance over prior
visual similarity approaches by an increase of 56 percent points in
matching accuracy and 30 in the classification ROC area under the
curve.
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A EXTRA EVALUATION AND QUALITATIVE
RESULTS
We here show supplementary results. In Figure 13, we present the
ROC curves of the binary classification task for each experiment
in the ablation study (discussed in subsection 6.2). In Figure 14, we
show a histogram of the phishing pages false matches per website
(subsection 7.2). In Figure 15, we show successful matching exam-
ples of the new crawled phishing pages (subsection 6.8). Moreover,
in Figure 16, we show correct matches across different websites
with similar colors that were still correctly distinguished from each
other (subsection 7.1). Finally, in Figure 17, we show successful
examples where the website logo’s colors and fonts were different
than the whitelist to test versions changes (subsection 7.3).
Figure 13: ROC curves for the ablation study in Table 1. The
legend follows the same order of rows in Table 1.
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Figure 14: Histogram of the wrong matches of phishing
pages to their targeted website. The most frequent 19 web-
sites are shown.
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Figure 15: Examples of the newly crawled phishing pages
(row 1) that were correctly matched to the targeted website
where the closest whitelist screenshots are in row 2.
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Figure 16: Examples of websites with similar colors that
were correctly distinguished from each other.
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Figure 17: Examples of successfullymatched phishing pages
where the website logo’s fonts and colors are slightly differ-
ent than the whitelist. The first example contains an older
version’s logo, while the second example contains a newer
version’s logo (from the newly crawled data).
B MORE DATASET DETAILS AND EXAMPLES
We show here more details about the WhitePhish dataset. In Fig-
ure 18, we show a histogram of the most targeted websites by the
crawled phishing pages (section 4). Figure 19 shows the categories
in the benign test set that we constructed to reduce bias by having
similar categories to the whitelisted websites (section 4). Figure 20
shows examples of the test set used to test browser differences (sub-
section 6.7). Figure 21 shows examples of the test set used to test
false positives when whitelisted logos are found in the page (subsec-
tion 7.1). Examples of the variations (e.g. designs, colors and layout)
of the dataset’s phishing pages targeting one website are demon-
strated in Figure 22. Examples of the poorly designed (i.e. dissimilar
to their targets) phishing pages are in Figure 23. Also, Figure 24
shows examples of the newly crawled phishing pages to test the
performance against zero-day pages (subsection 6.8). Finally, Fig-
ure 25 shows examples of the screenshots used in the online user
study to evaluate dissimilar examples (discussed in subsection 7.2).
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Figure 18: A histogram of the 23most frequent websites that
were found in the unique phishing set.
Fo
rm
s
Ba
nk
s
Sa
aS
Sh
op
pi
ng
Tr
av
el
Ne
ws
Ed
uc
at
io
n
Pa
ym
en
t
Go
v.
Bl
og
s
Ga
m
es
Te
le
co
m
St
or
ag
e
Ot
he
r0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 (%
)
Figure 19: The categories in the legitimate test set.
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Figure 20: Examples of the differences found between differ-
ent browsers from the 50 pages used to evaluate the effect of
browsers differences.
(a)
(b)
(c)
Figure 21: Examples of the test set (consisting of 125 pages)
used to evaluate the possiblewrongmatching to awhitelist’s
website whose logo appears in other benign pages (such as
articles and login pages).
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(a)
(b)
(c)
Figure 22: Examples of the variations in the WhitePhish
dataset of phishing examples targeting one website with no
counterparts in the crawled legitimate examples (training
list) of the same website.
(a)
(b)
(c)
Figure 23: Examples of phishing pages in the dataset that are
not similar enough (either in colors or design) to the legiti-
mate website which causes an increase in the mismatches
when not partially train with a part of the phishing set.
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
Figure 24: Examples of the new phishing pages from Phish-
Tank that are used to test zero-day pages. These pages do
not have counterparts in the targeted website’s screenshots
in the whitelist and were not seen in training.
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Figure 25: Examples of the phishing pages used in the online studywhere participantswere asked if they think the appearances
of these pages are trustworthy. Thefirst column screenshots are from the dissimilar examples. Only 3.02% of users (averaged on
all screenshots) considered them trustworthy. The second column screenshots are from the relatively more similar examples
(with subtle differences) where 65.3% of users considered them trustworthy.
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